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Abstract: 
 
We perform decoy-state quantum key distribution between a low-Earth-orbit 
satellite and multiple ground stations located in Xinglong, Nanshan, and Graz, 
which establish satellite-to-ground secure keys with ~kHz rate per passage of the 
satellite Micius over a ground station. The satellite thus establishes a secure key 
between itself and, say, Xinglong, and another key between itself and, say, Graz. 
Then, upon request from the ground command, Micius acts as a trusted relay. It 
performs bitwise exclusive OR operations between the two keys and relays the 
result to one of the ground stations. That way, a secret key is created between 
China and Europe at locations separated by 7600 km on Earth. These keys are 
then used for intercontinental quantum-secured communication. This was on the 
one hand the transmission of images in a one-time pad configuration from China 
to Austria as well as from Austria to China. Also, a videoconference was 
performed between the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences, which also included a 280 km optical ground connection between 
Xinglong and Beijing. Our work points towards an efficient solution for an ultra-
long-distance global quantum network, laying the groundwork for a future 
quantum internet. 
 
With the growth of internet use and electronic commerce, a secure global network 
for data protection is necessary. A drawback of traditional public key cryptography is 
that it is not possible to guarantee it is information theoretically secure. It has been 
witnessed in history that every advance of encryption has been defeated by advances in 
hacking. In particular, with the advent of Shor’s factoring algorithm [1], most of the 
currently used cryptographic infrastructure will be defeated by quantum computers. 
On the contrary, quantum key distribution (QKD) [2] offers unconditional security 
ensured by the law of physics. QKD uses the fundamental unit of light, single photons, 
encoded in quantum superposition states which are sent to a distant location. By proper 
encoding and decoding, two distant parties share strings of random bits called secret 
keys. However, due to photon loss in the channel, the secure QKD distance by direct 
transmission of the single photons in optical fibers or terrestrial free space was hitherto 
limited to a few hundred kilometers [3–7]. Unlike classical bits, the quantum signal in 
the QKD cannot be noiselessly amplified owing to the quantum no-cloning theorem [8], 
already contained at the core of Wiesner’s proposal of uncopiable quantum money [9], 
where the security of the QKD is rooted. 
The main challenge for a practical QKD is to extend the communication range to 
long distances, ultimately on a global scale. A promising solution to this problem is 
exploiting satellite and space-based links [10,11]. That way, one can conveniently 
connect two remote points on Earth with greatly reduced channel loss because most of 
the photons’ propagation path is in empty space with negligible loss and decoherence. 
Very recently, QKD from a low-Earth-orbit satellite, Micius, to the Xinglong ground 
station close to Beijing has been demonstrated with a satellite-to-ground-station 
distance of up to 1200 km [12]. 
In this Letter, we use the Micius satellite as a trusted relay to distribute secure keys 
between multiple distant locations in China and Europe. The Micius satellite, launched 
in August 2016, orbits at an altitude of about 500 km. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the three 
cooperating ground stations are located in Xinglong (near Beijing, 40°23’45.12’’N, 
117°34’38.85’’E, altitude of 890 m), Nanshan (near Urumqi, 43°28’31.66’’N, 
87°10’36.07’’E, altitude of 2028 m), and Graz (47°4’1.72’’N, 15°29’35.92’’E, altitude 
of 490m). The distances from Xinglong to Nanshan and Graz are 2500 km and 7600 
km, respectively. 
In this work, QKD is performed in a downlink scenario—from the satellite to the 
ground. One of the payloads in the satellite is a space-qualified QKD transmitter [12], 
which uses weak coherent laser pulses to implement a decoy-state Bennett-Brassard 
1984 (BB84) protocol that is immune to the photon-number-splitting attack [13,14]. 
Eight tunable fiber lasers, emitting light pulses with a wavelength of ~850 nm at a 
repetition rate of 100 MHz, are used to generate the signal, decoy and vacuum states. 
After being collected into single-mode fibers and collimated, the laser pulses enter a 
BB84-encoding module. It consists of a half-wave plate (HWP), two polarizing beam 
splitters (PBSs), and one non-polarizing beam splitter (BS). The photons emitted and 
sent to the ground station are randomly prepared in one of the four polarization states: 
horizontal, vertical, linear 45°, and linear -45°. In the three ground stations, 
corresponding BB84-decoding setups are used, consisting of a BS, a HWP, two PBS 
and four single-photon detectors (see Supplemental Material). 
For secure QKD, the average intensity per pulse sent over the channel has to be at 
the single-photon level. As the photons travel from the fast-moving satellite (~7.6 km/s) 
through the atmosphere to the ground station over typically ~1000 km, several effects 
contribute to the channel loss such as beam diffraction, pointing errors, atmospheric 
turbulence and absorption. As is typical for photonic communication, decoherence can 
be ignored. To obtain a high signal-to-noise ratio in the QKD protocol, one cannot 
increase the signal power but only reduce the channel attenuation and background noise. 
In order to optimize the link efficiency, we combine a narrow transmitting beam 
divergence (~10 μrad) with high-bandwidth acquisition, pointing, and tracking 
technique that ensures a typical tracking accuracy of ~1 μrad (ref. [12] and Extended 
Data Table I). To reduce the background noise, the BB84-decoding setups in the optical 
ground stations are designed with a small field-of-view and employ low dark-count rate 
single-photon detectors. 
The satellite flies along a sun-synchronized orbit which circles Earth every 94 
minutes. Each night starting at around 0:50 AM local time, Micius passes over the three 
ground stations allowing for a downlink for a duration of ~300 s. Under reasonably 
good weather conditions, we can routinely obtain a sifted key rate of a ~3 kb/s at ~1000 
km physical separation distance and ~9 kb/s at ~600 km distance (at the maximal 
elevation angle, note that this distance is greater than the satellite height due to the fact 
that the satellite does not fly directly over the ground stations), respectively. The 
observed quantum bit error rates are in the range of 1.0%-2.4%, which is caused by 
background noise and polarization errors. The satellite is equipped with an 
experimental control box (see Supplemental Material) that is able to exchange classical 
data with dedicated ground stations through radio frequency channels, with uplink and 
downlink bandwidth of 1 Mbps and 4 Mbps, respectively. This allows us to implement 
the full QKD protocol including sifting, error correction and privacy amplification (see 
Supplemental Material), to obtain the final keys between the satellite and the three 
ground stations. Typical satellite-to-ground QKD performances between May and July 
2017 are summarized in Figure 1, with the final key length ranging from 400 kb to 833 
kb. 
Next, we rely on the satellite as a trusted relay to establish secure keys among the 
ground stations on Earth. Figure 2 shows the example of exchanging keys between the 
Xinglong and Graz stations. We denote the random keys shared between Micius and 
Xinglong as MX, and between Micius and Graz as MG. Micius can simply perform a 
bitwise exclusive OR operation (⊕) between MX and MG of the same string length, 
which then yields a new string: MX MG . The new string can then be sent through a 
classical communications channel to Xinglong or Graz, who can decode the other’s 
original key by another exclusive OR (i.e. 𝑀𝐺 = (𝑀𝑋⊕𝑀𝐺)⊕𝑀𝑋). This process 
can be easily understood as Micius uses MX to encrypt MG and Xinglong decrypts the 
cipher text to recover MG, shared with Graz. Such a key is known only to the two 
communicating parties and the satellite, but not any fourth party. In this work, we 
establish a 100 kB secure key between Xinglong and Graz. Similarly, secure keys 
between Nanshan and Xinglong, and between Nanshan and Graz can also be established. 
For a real-world application of the space-to-ground integrated quantum network, 
we transmitted a picture of Micius (with a size of 5.34 kB) from Beijing to Vienna, and 
a picture of Schrödinger (with a size of 4.9 kB) from Vienna to Beijing, using 
approximately 10kB from the 100kB secure quantum key for one-time-pad encoding 
(Figure 3).  
On 29th of September 2017, an intercontinental video conference was held 
between the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Austria Academy of Sciences. The 
satellite-based QKD network is combined with fiber-based metropolitan quantum 
networks, in which fibers are used to efficiently and conveniently connect many users 
inside a city with a distance scale of within 100 km. The Xinglong ground station is 
connected to the conference venue, Zhongguancun Software Park in Beijing via a 280-
km optical fiber link involving six trusted relays [15,16]. We employed the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES)-128 protocol that refreshed the 128-bit seed keys every 
second. The video conference lasted for 75 minutes with a total data transmission of ~2 
GB, which consumed ~70 kB of the quantum key generated between Austria and China. 
In summary, using Micius satellite as a trusted relay, we have demonstrated 
intercontinental quantum communication among multiple locations on Earth with a 
maximal separation of 7600 km. Our work already constitutes a simple prototype for a 
global quantum communications network. To increase the time and area coverage for a 
more efficient QKD network, we plan to launch higher-orbit satellites and implement 
day-time operation using telecommunication wavelength photons and tighter spatial 
and spectral filtering [17]. One limitation of the current implementation of the QKD 
protocol is that we have to trust the satellite itself, which can be overcome in the future 
using entanglement-based systems [18–20]. Other future developments will include 
multi-party connections from satellites to various ground stations in parallel, and the 
connection to large ground networks [16], at first in China and Europe and then on a 
global scale. 
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Figure caption 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the three cooperating ground stations (Graz, Nanshan and 
Xinglong). Listed are all paths which were used for key generation and the 
corresponding final key length. 
 
Figure 2: Schematic of key exchange procedure between Graz and Xinglong with the 
satellite as a trusted relay. After Micius distributed a key with Graz (MG) and Xinglong 
(MX) it performs a bitwise exclusive OR between those keys ( MX MG ) and sends 
this combined key via a classical channel towards Xinglong station. Combining the 
XORed key at Xinglong with MX leads to the same key (MG) on both sides. 
 
Figure 3: One-time-pad file transfer. A picture of Micius/Schrödinger was transferred 
between Beijing and Vienna one-time-pad encrypted with a secure key with a length of 
5.34kB/4.9kB, ensuring unconditional security. Binary view of pictures and keys are 
depicted where each pixel represents one byte of data/key encoded in a 256 color scale. 
Each side en-/decrypted the picture with a simple bitwise XOR operation. 
Micius – Graz, Austria
Date Sifted key QBER Final key
06/18/2017 1361 kb 1.4% 266 kb
06/19/2017 711 kb 2.3% 103 kb
06/23/2017 700 kb 2.4% 103 kb
06/26/2017 1220 kb 1.5% 361 kb
Micius – Nanshan, China
Date Sifted key QBER Final key
05/06/2017 1329 kb 1.0% 305 kb
07/07/2017 1926 kb 1.7% 398 kb
Micius – Xinglong, China
Date Sifted key QBER Final key
06/04/2017 279 kb 1.2% 61 kb
06/15/2017 609 kb 1.1% 141 kb
06/24/2017 848 kb 1.1% 198 kb
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